Latin American Growth-Inequality Regimes since 1600
During the late colonial decades, Latin America completed two centuries of growth unmatched anywhere in the world and inequality reached truly spectacular heights. For the half century starting with insurgency and independence in the early 1800s, inequality fell steeply and growth was so modest that the period is called the lost decades. With the appearance of the belle époque in the 1870s, growth rose to impressive levels again even by world standards, and inequality surged to the highest levels ever, where they have remained for a century. This paper explores the connection over these three growth-inequality regimes.
Independence, Lost Decades and Tough Transitions
Africa and Latin America secured their independence from European colonial rule a century and half apart: most of Latin America by 1820 1 and most of Africa by 1960.
Despite the distance in time and space, independence was followed in each case by a half-century of political instability, violence and economic stagnation, or what might be called lost decades. It did, however, produce a much more equal distribution of income and wealth than before or after.
Imperial Rule: Economic Integration, Imperial Deterrents and Stability
Imperial rule brought entire regions around the globe into direct contact with the rivalries between European states. Most colonies, however, did not become directly involved in these conflicts. In Latin America, the Dutch invaded Brazil's sugar-rich 1 Cuba and Puerto Rico are exceptions.
northeast in the early-mid 17 th century; Spain lost most of its Caribbean possessions in the 17th century and fought to defend the rest for most of the 18 th century; Spain and Portuguese Brazil skirmished over territory that is now Uruguay. But for the most part, the mainland colonies did not become the locus of disputes among European powers. The imperial occupation of Africa also occurred with a relatively low level of conflict, despite the belligerent nationalism that characterized the "great scramble" for Africa (Pakenham 1991; Abernethy 2000) . Only during World War I did imperial nations fight on the continent: African imperialists resolved their disputes usually through diplomacy.
Imperialism also brought a measure of economic integration. It fostered trade, if only because groups of colonies shared a single master. Trade and factor mobility were augmented within each of the imperial domains of Latin America due to common legal systems, fiscal policies, currencies, and governing structures. Spanish restrictions on inter-colonial trade in some products were imposed in the early 17 th century, but ended with the Bourbon reforms in the 18 th century. French-speaking territories in Africa formed a currency zone as did sterling for Britain's African colonies. Central Africa maintained a free trade zone; Southern Africa maintained a common tariff; and Britain promoted economic integration for Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in east Africa and Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Central Africa.
The imperial powers also successfully repressed internal challenges to colonial rule. In Latin America, potential threats came from ambitious European settlers, enslaved Africans and their descendants, and burdened indigenous peasants. Colonial governments produced few public goods, spent nothing on education and next to nothing on infrastructure apart from fortresses and customs houses. Thus, settlers demanded more power, more public goods, more privileges, and lower taxes. Spain and Portugal had virtually no police or professional military in their American colonies, but managed to deter (and occasionally suppress) settler-led revolts by maintaining their capacity to mobilize their vast imperial resources. This deterrent helped keep the settler elite in line, but they also needed imperial protection from the slaves and indigenous peasants that they exploited. Large-scale revolts by Indian and slave populations were rare, although low-intensity resistance was endemic (Coatsworth 1988) .
As was true of Latin America, European settlers in Africa adopted repressive labor strategies, forcefully seized land, and drove the indigenous population into crowded reserves. While the Crown had largely abandoned forced indigenous labor in Latin
America by the early 1600s (except in Peruvian mines), African and Latin American natives were both forced into formal labor markets to earn cash with which to pay taxes.
All of this produced high levels of inequality in both colonial regions.
Insurrection and Imperial Collapse
The decline of imperialism in both Latin America and Africa was not driven by some endogenous response to local forces but rather by exogenous events in Europe. In the former case, it was the Napoleonic wars that eroded Iberian power, while in the latter it was World War II. As in Spanish America, most African anti-colonial movements suffered initial defeat, but external shocks associated with World War II strengthened these movements while weakening imperial power. The imperialists traded war services for pledges of citizenship and equality. Financially exhausted by the costs of war, and embattled by anti-imperial uprisings in other parts of the globe, they also reluctantly conceded power to local politicians. In the French territories, African voters won the right to elect representatives to the Parliament in Paris. In English-speaking Africa, the British appointed local politicians to legislative institutions; later, they filled these posts through elections; and later still they modified the colonial governor's Cabinet in the same manner. Like Latin America 150 years earlier, a less unequal Africa was emerging with independence.
Post-Colonial Violence
As the empires collapsed, so too did imperial defenses against external intervention and the imperial deterrent to internal conflict. 
Violence, Political Volatility and Post-Colonial Lost Decades
In post-colonial Latin America and Africa, high levels of violence, political instability, economic balkanization, and anti-trade policies all sabotaged economic growth and reduced state capacities below the already low levels that had characterized the colonial regimes. during an era when the European industrial core grew almost three times as fast. These post-independence decades were ones of dramatic falling behind for Africa, and it appears, once again, that conflict, violence and political instability were the root causes (Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier et al. 1999; Artadi and Sala-i-Matin 2003) . In short, economic performance in the half-century after independence was abysmal in both Latin America and Africa. Lost decades indeed.
Paul Collier and his collaborators offer insight into the impact of violence on private capital in Africa (Collier et al. 2002) . Conflict affected both the composition and the quantity of capital. In the face of political instability, uncertainty over property rights and potential violence, individuals tend to hold more mobile forms of capital, liquid rather than fixed investments or land. And when fighting destroys old capital, investment in new capital also declines. Both the reduction in the demand for local capital and the shift from fixed to liquid assets promoted capital flight. One estimate has it that 40 percent of private African wealth had been moved offshore by 1980, and that the threat of violent conflict was among the most important determinants of capital flight (Collier et al. 2002, p. 22) .
Others have also found a direct relationship between civil war and poor economic growth in Africa, the channel of influence running through capital formation (GyimahBrempong and Corley 2005). The impact was very large relative to average growth rates, something in excess of 4 percentage points. Collier and his colleagues calculated that the long term effect amounted to a growth rate reduction of 2.1 percentage points over the five years following a civil war (Collier et al. 1999) . The Collier estimate is large enough to account for a major portion of the lost decades gap between Africa's GDP per capita growth rate and that of other parts of the world. Prevailing economic doctrines, political commitments to socialism, and pressures for economic redistribution put a political premium on these interventionist policies. Indeed, governments adopted such policies in 60 percent of the cases by the mid-1970s. Even
Africa's coastal economies, which were spared civil war in the post-imperial period, were subjected to these anti-trade and anti-market policies. This fact may help explain their failure to emulate the growth performance of coastal economies in other parts of the developing world in the late 20 th century, especially those of Asia (Sachs 2001) . Table 2 offers some summary statistics confirming that both regions were highly protectionist, anti-global, and had high tariffs (and export taxes). The average Latin American tariff rate in 1870 was about 24 percent, more than four times that of the European core. 5 Furthermore, Latin America relied heavily on customs duties as a source of revenue. The average share of customs duties in total revenues across eleven Latin
American republics was 57.8 percent between 1820 and 1890 (Bates et al. 2007, p. 14) .
Customs revenues were even more important for federal governments (65.6 percent). In the modern era, when non-tariff barriers are often much more effective in reducing trade, the average African tariff rate was still almost 15 percent as much as ideology drove much of this activity, which was often accompanied by new tariff codes, fiscal reform, and the reorganization of judicial systems.
Lost Decades and the World Economic Environment
The net effect of these institutional changes was to liberate economic activity from a burdensome colonial legacy and to make for a much less unequal society: they undermined state-sanctioned private privileges of the elite and dismantled colonial monopolies. Thus, the Latin American republics drifted toward liberalism and less inequality throughout the lost decades. Similarly, state-centered, anti-market strategies in Africa were undermined and the liberalization of economic policies was set in motion.
Governments had over-valued their currencies, undermined export incentives and created incentives for smuggling. Because total public revenues relied so heavily on import and export taxes, they declined. In addition, governments that had regulated industries and imposed price controls created incentives for economic activity to shift to the informal economy, where it remained untaxed. This policy induced fiscal crisis and contributed to the collapse of political order. Furthermore, since governments had retained power by targeting economic benefits to powerful constituencies, the decline in public revenues led to a rise in political instability. When governments could not pay their military forces -or paid them in worthless currencies --soldiers began to pay themselves in kind by engaging in extortion and looting, giving rise to even higher levels of economic insecurity.
Reform, Recovery and the Belle Époque
Nearly everything changed in Latin America after the 1860s. First, there came political (and often military) victory of Liberal political forces that eliminated ethnic discrimination by the state, abolished slavery, separated church and state, put an end to archaic property rights in land, privatized public assets (especially land), abolished internal customs, and eliminated public monopolies. Second, long term stability was secured in most cases by means of historic compromises among competing economic interests. Once conservatives accepted the new rules of the game, militarism and popular mobilization were replaced by governing arrangements that provided major domestic and foreign business groups secure access to influence. Third, the new political economy came to be embodied in modern civil and commercial codes, judicial reform and reorganization, new banking and insurance laws, renegotiation of domestic and external debts, tariff protection for industries in the larger economies, increasing public investment in physical infrastructure and security. Fourth, stability facilitated economic growth, which helped to cement the new political economy (Ponzio 2005 America after the lost decades were over.
Latin America finally emerged from its post-independence lost decades into a second half-century of impressive growth and political stability. But the social costs of the policies that led to this Latin American outcome were high, generating benefits for the few, more economic inequality, and political exclusion.
Next, we now turn to the evidence confirming this growth-inequality trade-off over the three centuries between 1600 and 1929.
Inequality, Independence and the Belle Époque: Climbing Up the Trade-Off
Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy believe that Latin America has always had very high levels of income and wealth inequality. They see today a more unequal Latin America compared with Asia and the rich post-industrial nations (López and Perry 2008) and then assume that this must always have been true. Indeed, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) have famously argued that high inequality appeared very early in the post-conquest Americas, and that this fact supported rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions which help explain the disappointing growth performance we observe there even today. This conclusion is not supported by recent research. Latin America certainly did reach very high levels of inequality at the end of the colonial era, but it was not any higher than pre-industrial western Europe. Furthermore, inequality fell markedly during the insurgency and lost decades after independence, so much so that it was quite a bit Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies where classes were clearly delineated, where the differences in mean incomes between them were substantial, and where mobility between them was trivial. If class (and race) were the primary determinants of income, and if income differences between classes were large while income differences within classes were small (mainly reflecting life-cycle status and luck), then most inequality would be explained by average income differences between classes. Indeed, when income variance within class is also available for any preindustrial country offering social table estimates, the differences between measured inequality are typically very small whether within class variance is included or excluded.
In short, the lion's share of inequality in pre-industrial societies is and was accounted for by between-class average income differences. Elsewhere, empirical analysis of Figure 1 has confirmed the following (Milanovic et al. 2008) : The Kuznets hypothesis posits that inequality tends to follow a bell-shape as average real income increases. Although Kuznets formulated his hypothesis explicitly with a view toward industrializing and industrialized economies, his Curve is even more apparent among these pre-industrial economies, and for good reason. After all, the secular upswing in the Kuznets Curve could be easily explained by increases in per capita income: poor countries do not have much surplus for the elite to extract, but as income rises in pre-industrial economies, so does the surplus and potential inequality. In addition, the more urbanized countries had higher inequality, consistent with the common finding that inequality in urban areas tends to be higher than in rural areas (Ravallion et al. 2007 ).
Indeed, each percentage point increase in the urbanization rate is associated with an increase in the Gini by 0.35 points. Colonies were clearly much more unequal: holding everything else constant, non-colonies had a Gini almost 13 points lower than colonies: the latter were ruled by foreign elites which were able and willing to achieve higher extraction rates than weaker local elites; and countries with weak local elites but with large surpluses attracted powerful colonizers to extract it Robinson 2001, 2002) .
Population density is negatively associated with inequality. The negative impact of population density on inequality seems to be counter-intuitive. After all, conventional theory would predict that more population pressure on the land should raise land yields and land rents, lower labor's marginal product and the wage, thus producing more inequality, not less. Furthermore, this effect should have been all the more powerful in pre-industrial societies where land and labor drove inequality not, as in modern societies, human capital and financial wealth. It seems likely that this conventional effect is being offset in the ancient economy data by two forces. First, densely populated agrarian societies also had lower per capita income, so this may have been working against the conventional force (since inequality rises with per capita income). Second, more densely populated agrarian societies must have had higher relative food prices than thinly settled or frontier societies, so that nominal subsistence had to be much higher to purchase the more expensive foodstuffs, lowering measured inequality. 7 It seems likely that this force must have been most powerful during the two millennia before the middle of the 19 th century since a world market for grains did not yet exist and thus local conditions dictated the relative price of food (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008; Studer 2008 ).
This second offset has important implications for comparing inequality in the laborscarce and resource-abundant Americas with the labor-abundant and resource-scarce Europe, and between the densely populated highlands in Mexico and the Andes relative to resource-abundant Southern Cone.
7 Rarely do even modern inequality studies assess the impact of different class-specific cost-of-living trends on real inequality trends. We know this mattered hugely in early modern Europe (Hoffman et al. 2002) , and we need to know whether it has also mattered at any time in Latin America since 1491. When Latin America underwent her commodity export boom during the belle époque, did the rise in food export prices in the Southern Cone serve to raise real inequality even more than nominal inequality? Did it have the opposite effect in Mexico, which imported cheap corn from the United Figure 18 ).
It is not true that pre-industrial Latin America was more unequal than preindustrial northwest Europe. Thus, if inequality encouraged rent-seeking and discouraged growth in Latin America, it must have done it even more so in northwest Europe where the industrial revolution first started! Since we know that high inequality was consistent with industrial revolutions occurring in northwest Europe, it is unclear why it should be inconsistent with them in Latin America somewhat later. Indeed, the qualitative evidence reviewed above suggests that higher inequality was closely correlated with faster growth in Latin America after 1600. What about the quantitative evidence?
Broad Sweep: Reconstructing Latin American Inequality Trends since 1600 Table 5 and Figure 2 use the MLW Gini regression discussed above to predict Ginis for Latin America in 1600, 1700, 1790, 1820, 1870 and 1929. Over the two centuries between 1600 and 1790, a number of fundamentals were at work in Latin America which served to raise inequality. First, populations partially recovered their 16 th century losses, rising from 8.6 million in 1600 to 12.5 million in 1790. Thus, population density rose from about 0.78 to 1.14, and land-labor ratios fell by about 31 percent. Second, GDP per capita rose from 438 to 650, or almost by half, probably the fastest growing region over those two centuries. Urbanization rose from 9 to 14.2 percent, or by more than half, and to levels exceeding most of Europe. These forces imply that the Gini might have risen from 36.2 to 57.6, which implies that over the three centuries between 1600 and 1870 Latin American inequality reached its peak in the late colonial decades just prior to independence (Table 5) .
Independence, Lost Decades and Egalitarian Gains
While revolution, independence and the lost decades that followed up to about 1870 were very complicated times, and while there must have been many forces at work influencing inequality, the MLW ancient inequality regression predicts that the Gini probably dropped from 57.6 in 1790 to 46.4 in 1870, consistent with the qualitative evidence cited in the first part of this paper. The biggest force contributing to this big fall Figure 1 ) confirms this sharp fall in inequality after independence. She uses data on wage rates and land rents to infer trends in inequality.
When her rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela are weighted by 1850 populations, the resulting Latin American rent-wage ratio falls by 11 percent between 1820 and 1850, and for Mexico alone the fall is 12 percent. Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad Mexican rent-wage ratio trends and the Mexican Gini coefficients coming from and mineral rents were driven up relative to wages. This happened everywhere around the poor periphery (Williamson 2002 (Williamson , 2008 , but it was especially dramatic in Latin America partly because the region was able to expand its export sectors so effectively, thus to become very large shares in GDP (Williamson 2009 : Table 4 .1). Since land and mineral resources were held by those at the top, inequality rose as well.
Not too long ago, the only data we had to judge the magnitude of these inequality trends were proxies, like the land rent to unskilled wage ratio or the GDP per worker to unskilled wage ratio (Williamson 1999 (Williamson , 2002 . Thus, when the rent-wage ratios for Table 12 .1) calls his backward projected Pseudo-Ginis. They both tell the same tale: inequality rose by 11-37 percent over the belle époque. True, the Latin American weighted average reported in Table 7 refers only to four republics in the Southern Cone -Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, an average that misses the heavily populated Mexican and Andean republics.
However, Prados de la Escosura also shows that a Mexican inequality proxy --income per worker relative to the unskilled wage ratio --rose by about 2.8 times between the early 1880s and 1920 (Prados de la Escosura 2007: Figure 12 .1b), suggesting that over its four Porfiriato pre-revolutionary decades Mexico followed the Southern Cone by recording a steep rise in inequality. The Brazilian inequality index increased by 45 percent between the early 1880s and the mid 1920s (Prados de la Escosura 2007: Figure   12 .1b). Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad rent-wage inequality proxy for Mexico confirms the Prados data since the 1870-1900 increase was 27 percent over the three decades. It follows that Latin American inequality probably rose by 30 percent or more over the belle époque. Applying that increase to the 1870 Latin American Gini coefficient in Table 5 would imply that it rose from 46.4 to 60.3, making the Gini in the 1920s the highest that Latin America had recorded since 1492, even higher than the 1790 colonial peak (57.6), and much, much higher than 1600 (36.2), or even 1700 (48.5).
A Latin American Growth-Inequality Trade-Off Revealed
Compared with the rest of the world, Latin America underwent fast economic growth across the two colonial centuries up to insurrection in the early 1800s, very poor economic growth over the five post-independence decades up to 1870, and fast economic growth again during the belle époque up to the 1920s. Figure 2 traces out the region's inequality over the same three regimes reaching a high at the end of the first regime, a low at the end of the second regime, and its highest at the end of the last regime. 
